JEJOMAR C. BINAY, for and in G.R.
No. 170643
behalf
of his minor daughter, JOANNA*
MARIE
BIANCA S. BINAY,
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
-
versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
GENIVI V. FACTAO and Promulgated:
VICENTE G. TIROL,
Respondents. September 8, 2006
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This petition for review assails the November
22, 2004 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75989, which affirmed the Resolutions dated
July 2, 2002[2] and
January 8, 2003[3] of the
Secretary of Justice reversing the Makati City Prosecutor’s finding of probable
cause against private respondents and ordering the withdrawal of the
information for libel filed in court against them, as well as the November 25,
2005 Resolution,[4] denying petitioner’s** motion for reconsideration.
In the
Si
Joanne Marie Bianca, 13 ang sinasabing ampong anak ng mga Binay, ay bumibili ng
panty na nagkakahalaga ng P1,000 ang isa, ayon sa isang writer ni Binay. Magarbo ang pamumuhay ng batang ito dahil
naspoiled umano ng kanyang ama.
Based on this article, Elenita S.
Binay, mother of the minor Joanna Marie Bianca,[5] filed
a complaint[6] for
libel against private respondents Vicente G. Tirol as publisher, and Genivi V.
Factao as writer of the article, with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati. The pertinent portions of the
complaint read:
x
x x x
5. GENIVI V. FACTAO, as writer of the said
article, voluntarily, illegally, and with the object to insinuate and made it
understood, and was in effect understood and interpreted by the public who read
it, that the young lady referred to therein can be no other than my daughter
Joanne, in this manner transmitting maliciously and intentionally to the public
the impression that Joanne is a spoiled, spendthrift brat who would not mind or
care to spend P1,000 for her underwear, all as already stated, with the object
of destroying her reputation and discrediting and ridiculing her before the bar
of public opinion.
6. The said article, for whatever its
avowed purpose may be, is clearly aimed at scurrilously attacking my husband
Jejomar C. Binay. In which case, the
insinuations directed at Joanne are clearly pointless and was done only for
purposes of exposing Joanne to public contempt.
6.1. That the said article should specifically
focus in on Joanne’s panty is a clear and malicious invasion of her privacy and
calculated to heap scorn and ridicule upon her.
On top of this, there is no connection whatsoever to her being an
adopted child despite which this was needlessly and maliciously highlighted.[7]
Joanna also submitted an affidavit[8]
where she claimed that:
4. The article was completely unmindful of
the hurt and anguish I felt after it needlessly and maliciously highlighted my
being an adopted daughter. Furthermore,
the article is a blatant lie. I have
never in my life bought an underwear costing P1,000.00 or more. On the contrary, I have always maintained to
keep a simple and modest life as it is how my parents had brought me up. The questioned article has no valid object except
to destroy my reputation and to discredit and to bring ridicule upon me before
my peers and that of the public.
Private respondents did not file
their counter-affidavits.
The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case for libel and recommended the filing of information against
private respondents. The case[9]
was filed with the
Alleging that they did not receive
the subpoena and copy of the complaint, private respondents filed an omnibus
motion to re-open the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor, however, denied private
respondents’ motion for reconsideration,[10] thus
they filed a petition for review[11]
with the Secretary of Justice.
On
WHEREFORE,
the present petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the Resolutions dated
SO
ORDERED.[16]
The Court of Appeals also denied Elenita’s
motion for reconsideration, hence this petition, raising the following issues:
I. The CA erred in not holding
that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
II. The CA erred in not holding that
the public respondent gravely abused its discretion for not abiding by the
ruling in Sazon vs. Court of Appeals
which states that an attack upon the private character of a public officer on
matters which are not related to the discharge of his official functions may be
libelous.
III. The
CA erred in not holding that there is probable cause to indict private
respondents for the crime of libel and that they are probably guilty thereof.[17]
In a resolution dated
The issue to be resolved is whether there
is prima facie evidence showing that the
subject article was libelous.
Petitioner
claims that the article is defamatory as it tends to, if not actually, injure Joanna’s
reputation and diminish the esteem, respect, and goodwill that others have of
her. Petitioner alleges that there is no
good intention or justifiable motive in publishing Joanna’s status as an
adopted child which is essentially a private concern and the purchase of an
expensive intimate apparel, but to ridicule and to induce readers to lower
their perception of Joanna.
On the other hand, private
respondents allege that they did not harp on Joanna’s status as an adopted
child as the same was mentioned only once in the article; that they did not intend
to injure her reputation or diminish her self-esteem; that they referred to the
price of the underwear not for the purpose of maligning her or to make her look
frivolous in the public’s eyes, but to show that petitioner and his family lead
lavish and extravagant lives; and that this matter is within the realm of
public interest given that petitioner is an aspirant to a public office while
his wife is an incumbent public official.
We
grant the petition.
Under Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code, libel is defined as “a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.” Its
elements are as follows: (a) an imputation of a discreditable act or
condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and (d) the existence of malice.[19] Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, it
must be defamatory, malicious, published, and the
victim is identifiable.[20]
The elements of
publication and identity of the person defamed are present in this case. Thus, in resolving the issue at hand, we
limit our discussion on whether paragraph 25 of the subject article contains
the two other elements of libel, to wit: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another,
i.e., whether the paragraph is
defamatory; and (b) existence of malice.
In MVRS Pub. Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils., Inc.,[21]
we defined defamatory language in this wise:
Defamation, which includes libel and
slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation
through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good
will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions
about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of
another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of
a relational interest since it
involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have,
of the plaintiff.
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel
or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious,
ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis
for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages. The fact that the language
is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
(Emphasis added)
In determining whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used are
construed in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless
it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[22]
Tested against the foregoing, we find
that there is prima facie showing
that paragraph 25 of the subject article is defamatory. It is opprobrious, ill-natured, and vexatious
as it has absolutely nothing to do with petitioner's qualification as a
mayoralty candidate or as a public figure.
It appears that private respondents’ only purpose in focusing on Joanna’s
status as an adopted child and her alleged extravagant purchases was to malign
her before the public and to bring her into disrepute. This is a clear and simple invasion of her
privacy.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People,[23] the Court found libelous a letter
addressed to a lawyer for using words such as “lousy,”
“inutile,” “carabao English,” “stupidity,” and “satan.” It cast aspersion
on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer and
exposed him to public ridicule. Evidence aliunde was found unnecessary
to prove libel.
In the same manner, we need not require
any evidence aliunde to prove that paragraph
25 is defamatory. It has exposed Joanna
to the public at large as a spoiled and spendthrift adopted daughter and a
compulsive buyer who has no qualms buying expensive lingerie.
Private respondents argue
that paragraph 25 constitutes privileged communication because it was a fair
comment on the fitness of petitioner to run for public office, particularly on
his lifestyle and that of his family. As
such, malice cannot be presumed. It is
now petitioner’s burden to prove malice in fact.
We are not
convinced.
In the first place, paragraph
25 does not qualify as a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication,
which Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code limits to the following instances: (1) A private communication made by a person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) A fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings,
or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
To qualify
under the first category of a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged
communication, paragraph 25 must fulfill the following elements: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal,
moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest
to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is
made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish
the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in
good faith and without malice. [24]
Whichever
way we view it, we cannot discern a legal, moral, or social duty in publishing Joanna's
status as an adopted daughter. Neither
is there any public interest respecting her purchases of panties worth
P1,000.00. Whether she indeed bought
those panties is not something that the public can afford any protection
against. With this backdrop, it is
obvious that private respondents' only motive in inserting paragraph 25 in the
subject article is to embarrass Joanna before the reading public.
In addition, the claim
that paragraph 25 constitutes privileged communication is a matter of defense, [25]
which is can only be proved in a full-blown trial. It is elementary that "a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof."[26]
Moreover, under Article
354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown. It is thus incumbent
upon private respondents to prove that "good intention and justifiable
motive" attended the publication of the subject article.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 75989 dated November 22, 2004, upholding
the Justice Secretary’s Resolutions dated July 2, 2002 and January 8, 2003, ordering
the withdrawal of the information filed against private respondents Genivi V.
Factao and Vicente G. Tirol and the Resolution dated November 25, 2005, denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is ORDERED to continue and proceed with
the case for libel against private respondents Vicente G. Tirol and Genivi V.
Factao.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* Also
spelled as Joanne in other parts of the rollo.
[1] Rollo, pp. 136-145. Penned by Associate
Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.
[2]
[3]
[4]
** In the proceedings before the Prosecutor’s office, Department of Justice, and the Court of Appeals, Joanna was represented by her mother, Elenita S. Binay. It was only before this Court that Jejomar C. Binay was substituted as petitioner.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Docketed as Crim. Case No. 01-1950.
[10]
[11]
[12]
She now heads the Office of the Ombudsman.
[13] Rollo, pp. 96-98.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 128959,
[20] Sazon v. Court
of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1053, 1062 (1996); Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 236-237 (1997).
[21] G.R. No. 135306, 444 Phil. 230, 241
(2003).
[22] Novicio v. Aggabao, 463 Phil. 510, 516 (2003).
[23] G.R. No. 142509,
[24] Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541, 569.
[25] People v. Gomez, No. L-32815,
[26] Baytan v. COMELEC, 444 Phil. 812,
819-820 (2003).